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Remembering Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa 
I met Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa in the early 
1970s as a new young professional in the 
Research Department of Banca d’Italia, where he 
was head of the monetary policy unit. Many of us 
newcomers, fresh from American graduate 
studies, were appalled by the Bank’s monetary 
approach, replete with quantitative controls and 
administrative measures to channel funds to an 
insatiable Treasury.  
Tommaso, who already participated in the bank’s 
inner policy-making circle, often sobered our 
fervent criticisms with irony; but it was he who 
first proposed to the Bank to abandon fixed rates 
in Treasury bill auctions, opening the way to the 
complete independence of monetary policy that 
was to come in the 1980s. Those open exchanges, 
in an atmosphere of strong commitment to public 
service, created solidarities and friendships that 
have lasted up to today, in spite of divergent 
professional paths.  
Tommaso’s approach to European affairs was a 
unique combination of vision and realism. An 
economist by training, over and over again he 
showed a special ability to rise above the 
prejudices of his profession and push forward 
institution-building with feasible arrangements 
that could muster the necessary political support. 
In the last years of his life, like many of us, he was 
deeply concerned for the waning support for the 
European project. He considered the European 
construction the most compelling bequest of the 
20th century in the domain of political institutions. 
“Nowadays we know, and we must tell our 
children and teach in our schools that the will to 
power of nation states as well as individuals may 
be channelled through a rule eventually capable 
of depriving it of its capacity to overwhelm and 
destroy” (quote from his book L’Europa forza 
gentile, Il Mulino, 2001, pp. 13-14, my translation).  
But he saw that the construction of Europe was 
incomplete and he often repeated, in his late 
days, that either it would find the compromises 
necessary to strengthen its institutions – notably 
in the economic domain – or it could go into 
reverse and break down. He was also convinced 
that the time of technocratic and elitist decisions 
was gone and the imbalance between democratic 
member states and technocratic European 
institutions had become a straightjacket 
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Unfortunately, he was right and his fears were 
well grounded. Poor leadership has transformed 
a small debt crisis into a confidence crisis that is 
threatening the very survival of our monetary 
union. And, as I will argue, treaty changes under 
discussion are mainly motivated by political 
expediency and cannot tackle the existential 
problems affecting the eurozone and the Union. 
The entire European construction is at risk. 
Unfortunately, Tommaso is no longer with us to 
help sort out the incredible mess created by short-
sighted political leaders.  
Crisis management is failing 
Some eighteen months past the first Greek rescue 
(May 2010), crisis management in the euro zone 
has clearly failed to restore confidence. Indeed, 
following each round of emergency measures 
matters have turned for the worse (see Figure 1 
showing the widening spreads, over the German 
Bund, for sovereign borrowing in the eurozone). 
The solemn decisions of the December 9 
Eurosummit already seem in tatters.  
 
Figure 1. 10-years government bonds spread vs. German bund, 1 Dec. 2009 – 12 December 2011 (%)* 
 
Notes: [1] May 2010: Adoption of the first financial assistance package for Greece and establishment of the European 
Financial Stability Fund. 
[2] 18 October 2010: Deauville agreement between France and Germany destabilises financial markets. 
[3] 24-25 March 2011: European Council agrees on new economic governance. 
[4] 21 July 2011: Eurozone leaders agree on a rescue package for Greece and EU crisis management framework 
but announce 20% loss on Greek debt for private investors. 
[5] 26 October 2011: Eurozone economic governance tightened, liquidity support still weak, losses for private 
creditors raised to 50%. 
[6] 8-9 December 2011: European Council reaches bungled agreement on Treaty reform and financing 
arrangements that fails to convince markets. 
* Daily data. 
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Meanwhile, contagion has spread beyond Spain 
and Italy to the core sovereigns. France is close to 
losing its Triple A rating and spreads over the 
Bund have opened up for Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, The Netherlands. Even Germany has 
experienced partial failure in a Bund auction on 
November 23. The banking system Europe-wide 
is under increasing strain, with term funding all 
but closed for any bank with significant exposure 
to distressed sovereign debtors and the interbank 
market close to seizing up. Deposit withdrawals 
have surfaced in a number of large banks from 
the periphery. The euro has started to weaken in 
foreign exchange markets, narrowing the room 
for a distinction between the eurozone debt crisis 
and the euro-currency crisis from which some 
observers were until recently drawing comfort.  
These developments raise once again the 
fundamental question: what is it that is not 
working? Why is it that dramatic changes in our 
policies and institutions within the eurozone are 
failing to halt the meltdown of confidence? An 
answer is needed, and needed soon – because 
along this path the breakdown of the eurozone is 
a concrete possibility.  
Reform under way in the eurozone 
One important strand of opinion, notably in 
Germany and other Northern European 
countries, maintains that the culprit is lax fiscal 
policies and excessive debt accumulation by some 
eurozone member states. Greece, for one, is 
defaulting on its debt obligations, despite very 
harsh corrective measures – albeit its plight have 
been aggravated by its economy, as a 
consequence, going into free fall and its political 
system coming under close-to-unbearable strain 
to keep the austerity course. But the numbers are 
small and would not endanger the solidity of 
Europe’s banking system even under extreme 
hypotheses of debt restructuring. 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain have adopted public 
sector consolidation measures and market 
reforms which have won good marks by the 
Commission, the ECB and the IMF; and indeed 
their sovereign interest rate spreads over the 
German Bund were all receding – dramatically so 
for Ireland – up until the latest round of meetings 
by the Eurosummit at end-October and early 
December (Figure 1). Last summer sovereign 
selling pressures extended to Italy, which has a 
small deficit but a large debt-to-GDP ratio (120%). 
Eventually, harsh budgetary measures, including 
a sweeping pension reform, were decided to 
anticipate budgetary balance to 2013, and a fresh 
round of structural reforms and market opening 
measures were decided. Meanwhile, the economy 
is falling into recession and the spread over the 
Bund remains in the upper-400-basis-points 
region. 
In sum, budgetary consolidation seems well 
under way in all ‘sinning’ countries together with 
long-awaited structural reforms. Based on IMF 
forecasts to 2016, after increasing in the aftermath 
of the 2008-09 financial and economic crisis, 
sovereign debts are expected to stabilise at 
manageable ratios to GDP in all of the eurozone 
countries except Greece – but will not decline, 
due to persistently slow growth. And market 
assessments of their sovereign debts are barely 
improving. 
Furthermore, the eurozone suffers from large 
competitive imbalances between its members 
which are reflected in large and growing 
imbalances in current external payments. 
Germany and the Netherlands in 2011 are 
expected to record current external surpluses 
close to 6% of GDP, with their counterpart largely 
represented by deficits in the eurozone periphery 
– with the exception of Ireland that has a 3% 
surplus. With the unfolding confidence crisis, the 
increase in private savings in the periphery has 
prompted large widening of public sector deficits, 
while private capital flows turned away from the 
periphery and the financing of external deficits 
fell almost exclusively on official sources – 
showing up as ECB Target balances. This 
evidence has prompted some authors to read the 
ongoing crisis in the eurozone as a balance of 
payment crisis.1 
Thus, the eurozone has turned into a 
straightjacket where everyone is tightening 
budgetary policies, growth falters and, in 
addition, the periphery countries must engineer 
substantial real exchange rate devaluations to 
regain competitiveness and reabsorb their 
external deficits – while the core countries will do 
                                                      
1 Hans-Werner Sinn and Timo Wollmerschauer, “Target 
Loans, current account balance and capital flows: the 
ECB’s rescue facility”, NBER Working Paper 17626, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 
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nothing to strengthen aggregate demand and 
relieve pressure on their partners. Thus, if the 
periphery succeeds, both the core and the 
periphery will suffer from falling aggregate 
demand; if it doesn’t succeed, either the deficits 
will continue to be financed, leading to further 
accumulation of external debt, or the entire 
eurozone will fall into depression, with sovereign 
debtors eventually defaulting on their liabilities.2 
This unsustainable policy pattern may be at least 
in part responsible for the crisis of confidence 
gripping the eurozone. If this is the case, a lasting 
solution will have to include credible measures to 
raise the eurozone growth rates – a theme notably 
absent, so far, in the Eurosummit agendas. 
Stronger economic governance  
Meanwhile, economic governance in the 
eurozone has been strengthened to unthinkable 
heights as regards both substance and 
enforcement procedures. The Integrated Policy 
Guidelines of Article 121 TFEU are now assisted 
by legally binding enforcement procedures, while 
the European Semester ensures ex-ante 
coordination of economic policies and time-
consistent decision-making processes in the 
Member States and the European Council. And 
the Eurosummit has formalized a new 
governance structure for the euro area entailing 
regularly meetings of the Heads of State or 
Government (“at least twice a year“) and a 
permanent presidency; a strengthened role of the 
Eurogroup which will set up its own permanent 
structure in Brussels; and a special monitoring 
committee comprising the presidents of the 
Eurosummit, the Commission and the Eurogroup 
which will meet “at least” once a month. 
The excessive deficit procedure has been 
reinforced in both its preventive and corrective 
arm, and now includes fresh constraints on the 
growth of public expenditures and operational 
criteria for public debt reduction (the ‘1/20 rule’); 
and there is a new procedure, also legally binding 
and assisted by sanctions, for the correction of 
‘excessive economic imbalances’, explicitly 
targeting competitive imbalances and their 
underlying causes. The Euro-Plus Pact details the 
enhanced policy commitments of eurozone 
                                                      
2 Martin Wolf, “A disastrous failure at the summit”, 
Financial Times, 14 December 2011. 
members for budgetary stability, structural 
reforms and market opening.  
Eurozone members are also required to 
strengthen their national budgetary frameworks 
with the adoption of multi-year planning, top-
down decision-making procedures and 
independent evaluation agencies. Italy and Spain 
have already decided to insert balance-budget 
rules in their constitutions. 
The European Commission has been given 
independent powers to signal emerging 
deviations form agreed policy guidelines, and 
make recommendations to the Council on the 
opening of formal procedures, down to the phase 
of sanctions, that the Council can only reject or 
weaken with ‘reverse’ qualified majorities. New 
proposed Regulations, now before Council and 
Parliament for approval, will require eurozone 
member states to present their draft budgets at 
the same time each year and, before national 
parliaments decide on them, give sufficient time 
to the Commission to assess them and, if need be, 
ask for revisions when it considers that the draft 
budget violates the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Stronger provisions are envisaged for eurozone 
countries in excessive deficit procedure.3 
Against this background, it is worth dwelling for 
a moment on the new decisions on economic 
governance taken by the Eurosummit on 
December 9. Once again, failure of the previous 
Eurosummit, on October 26, to halt financial 
turmoil, raised pressure on Germany to expand 
liquidity support in eurozone sovereign debt 
markets. Once again, half-baked, unconvincing 
measures to that effect were accompanied by new 
demands to tighten the governance screws, so as 
to appease a recalcitrant domestic public. Enters 
the new “fiscal compact”.4  
                                                      
3 Proposal for a Regulation on common provisions for 
monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and 
ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member 
States in the euro area, COM(2011)821 of 23.11.2011, and 
a Regulation on the strengthening of economic and 
budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or 
threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their 
financial stability in the euro area, COM(2011)819 of 
23.11.2011. 
4 These requests were anticipated by President Draghi of 
the ECB in his Statement before the European Parliament 
on December 1, where he stated that “I am confident that 
the new surveillance framework will restore confidence MISGUIDED POLICIES RISK BREAKING UP THE EUROZONE AND THE EU | 5 
 
A treaty change will oblige eurozone members to 
adopt a balanced-budget rule in their 
constitutions, and the European Court of Justice 
will be empowered to verify their correct 
transposition in national legislations. Members in 
excessive deficit shall submit an ‘economic 
partnership’ programme detailing the necessary 
structural reforms to ensure an ‘effectively 
durable’ correction of their deficits. And a 
mechanism will be put in place for the ex-ante 
reporting by Member States of their national debt 
issuance plans. The deficit and debt-reduction 
obligations under the excessive deficit procedure 
will be ‘enshrined in new provisions’, and there 
will be mechanisms for the automatic correction 
of any slippages. With national budgetary powers 
for sinners and potential sinners transferred to a 
new “compact” governed by Germany and 
managed on her behalf by a Committee made up 
by the presidents of the Eurosummit, the 
Commission and the ECB (with the IMF in 
attendance). 
One wonders whether all this is really feasible, 
technically and politically. For one thing, 
economic policy is a fairly complex matter, and 
past experience may reveal a poor guide to future 
decisions - as was the case with the deficit and 
debt criteria, which famously failed to detect 
developing imbalances in the private sector in the 
Irish and Spanish economies. For another, 
interactions between the Member States would be 
entirely overlooked, which seems quite odd in a 
highly integrated area: for instance, would an 
exogenous increase in the propensity to save in 
Germany always have to be met by a deflationary 
adjustment in Italy? 
As for the proposed treaty change, for the second 
time in less than a year5 a fundamental change in 
common policies in the eurozone would be 
enacted with an intergovernmental treaty outside 
the Union framework - opening the way to an 
                                                                                          
over time. I am also quite sure that countries overall are 
on the right track. But a credible signal is needed to give 
ultimate insurance over the short run. What I believe our 
economic and monetary union needs is a new fiscal 
compact  – a fundamental restatement of the fiscal rules 
…” (my italics). Thus, rather than large liquidity supply, 
the ‘big bazooka’ to stabilize financial markets in the 
short term is a new fiscal rule.  
5 The first was the amendment to Article 136 TFEU to set 
up the ESM. 
awkward combination of German direct rule over 
national fiscal policies under French inter-
governmentalism. Thus, the UK veto offered the 
pretext for a solution that fitted well with the 
Franco-German intentions but is potentially 
disruptive for the entire Union.  
First, there is a need to clarify why, in order to 
strengthen the legal underpinning of the new 
governance obligations, the leaders did not 
consider the possibility of using Article 136 TFEU, 
which empowers to “adopt measures specific to 
those member states whose currency is the euro”. 
Most, if not all of the measures of strengthened 
economic governance could be adopted under 
this legal basis – with the exception perhaps of 
the balanced budget ‘golden rule’, which is 
already in the Euro-Plus Pact and could anyway 
be turned into a political commitment. 
Incidentally, Article 136 procedure would allow 
to proceed more speedily, with qualified majority 
voting of eurozone members in the Council 
(unanimity only for provisions relating to the 
excessive deficit procedure), while the treaty 
changes envisaged by the Franco-German duo 
could well require two-to-three years to come 
into effect, barring an adverse referendum in 
some members (e.g. Ireland).  
Second, and more important, the treaty may well 
be reopened, but then more fundamental 
questions concerning the fiscal union would 
inevitably arise: including issues of explicit 
centralization of budgetary powers and related 
legitimizing controls at eurozone level, as well as 
the relation to be built between the Union and the 
eurozone institutions. More broadly, building up 
enhanced cooperation for economic policies 
outside the Union legal framework could over 
time damage the latter irreparably, owing to the 
temptation to pick and choose the most 
convenient legal framework in response to 
contingent political goals.  
The foreign currency syndrome 
Far from abating financial turmoil, the 
announcement of ever harsher governance 
measures has apparently provided fresh fuel to 
the fire. Either the announcements lack credibility 
– which does not seem the case, with policies on 
the right track everywhere - or there is something 
else which is missing in the leaders’ policy 
responses.  6 | STEFANO MICOSSI 
 
For one thing, non-eurozone countries, such as 
the US and the UK, not to mention Japan, with its 
mountainous public debt, have no problems in 
selling their paper, while within the eurozone 
even countries with a smaller debt/GDP ratio 
than Germany – Austria, Finland and the 
Netherlands – must pay a positive spread over 
the Bund on their government issues. 
Thus, the eurozone seemingly suffers from some 
special disease. That disease is the ‘foreign 
currency syndrome’ that was brought into full 
light by Professor Paul De Grauwe.6 Please note 
that if Professor De Grauwe is right – as I believe 
he is – then in all likelihood we are letting 
financial markets push us onto a path of excessive 
deflation that may eventually frustrate our efforts 
at budgetary consolidation – Greece docet.7  
The fundamental difference between a country 
which is a member of a monetary union and a 
country which has its own currency is that the 
former needs the permission of an institution that 
it does not control to increase liquidity – say to 
compensate for an outflow of liquidity through 
the banking system or stabilize the government 
bond market – while the latter does not. To each 
of the monetary union members, to all practical 
purposes the euro is like a foreign currency, since 
no one enjoys access to the euro printing press. 
As a consequence, eurozone members are 
exposed to currency runs. Such a system can 
switch rapidly from ‘fair weather’, where foreign 
currency risks are underpriced, to ‘bad weather’ 
where risks become overpriced. In the second 
scenario, the explosion of financing costs can 
make fears of a run self-fulfilling. 
The switch from ‘fair weather’ to ‘bad weather’ is 
not an entirely unpredictable event. A further 
feature of the monetary union is that one 
monetary policy must fit all – regardless of 
divergent prices and wages, productivity, market 
structure, public spending and taxation. When a 
country with higher inflation and structural 
rigidities joins a monetary union, initially it 
typically finds itself awash with liquidity, since 
the foreign-exchange risk premium disappears, 
real interest rates turn negative and borrowing 
becomes an irresistible bargain. Meanwhile, its 
                                                      
6 De Grauwe, P (2011), “The Governance of a Fragile 
Eurozone”, CEPS Working Documents, CEPS, Brussels. 
7 Latin for ‘teaches’. 
real exchange rate will appreciate and business 
competitiveness will suffer, leading to rising 
unemployment; but abundant credit will 
encourage to postpone adjustment and preserve 
inefficient jobs with public money. Public 
spending will rise and the public sector deficit 
will widen, while politicians will thrive on 
distributing subsidies and protections to broaden 
electoral consensus. 
Lax financing conditions may prevail for quite a 
long time, but sooner or later they are bound to 
come to a halt, as growing external and public 
sector deficits become unsustainable. Till one day, 
typically as a consequence of some exogenous 
shock, investors flee, liquidity evaporates and the 
divergent country finds itself unable to refinance 
its debts in private markets at acceptable prices – 
as it happened to Greece and Portugal.  
A variant of the model is one in which the 
economy in the divergent country experiences a 
real estate boom and rapid economic expansion, 
leading to unsustainable private indebtedness, 
while the public sector stays in good health thank 
to buoyant growth. But again, the real estate 
boom must come to an end and, when house 
prices start falling, private debts cannot be 
serviced and lending financial institutions 
become insolvent. Governments are then obliged 
to step in and rescue the banks: this is where 
unsustainable private indebtedness is turned into 
large government debt – as happened to Ireland 
and (to a lesser extent) Spain. 
Thus, lax and divergent national policies do carry 
responsibility for the sudden switch in 
confidence. When that happens, even countries 
that did not run divergent policies or, at any rate, 
maintain manageable exposures in ‘fair weather’, 
may find themselves unable to manage them after 
the shift to ‘bad weather’. With an extra 
ingredient: which is that national banking 
systems have in the meantime become highly 
interconnected – as ‘core’ country banks over-lent 
to divergent country banks and governments. 
Thus, any doubts on the sustainability of 
sovereign obligations in divergent countries are 
readily transformed into doubts on the 
sustainability of the banking system in the core, 
stable countries.  
Confidence in financial markets is a fickle 
commodity, that may evaporate quite rapidly 
unless investors can be reassured that a liquidity MISGUIDED POLICIES RISK BREAKING UP THE EUROZONE AND THE EU | 7 
 
crisis will not be allowed to develop into a 
solvency crisis for one member after another of 
the monetary union. Which is what has happened 
in the eurozone since Greece was first bailed out 
in May 2010. 
Liquidity support and debt restructuring 
A confidence crisis spreading contagion even to 
the ‘sound’ part of a monetary union can be 
stopped by abundant supply of liquidity by the 
central bank or by a common fund performing 
the same service, conditional on appropriate 
policy conditionality, with resources lent by the 
central bank or raised in capital markets – and in 
all likelihood both are needed, in some 
appropriate combination.  
Failure by the Eurosummit to agree on a strong 
and effective rescue fund has stiffened the ECB, 
which fears that losses on its distressed 
sovereigns holdings may one day force to turn to 
national governments for capital, and thus lose 
independence.  
Two stumbling blocks have so far impeded 
adequate liquidity support. The first one is fear 
that liquidity will reduce pressure on ‘sinners’ to 
adjust. All arguments that sinners are now 
mending their ways, under much strengthened 
common economic governance arrangements, 
have so far failed to convince – even if, as I have 
recalled, policies have turned in the right 
direction everywhere. Some will not be satisfied 
till they have direct powers by the union to 
intervene and change national policies, when 
these deviate from their policy commitments. 
However, everyone should be aware that even 
the best policy course will need time to produce 
its effects; in the meantime, adequate financing 
flows must be maintained, or adjustment policies 
will fail to prevent a currency run. 
The second ingredient in the unfolding drama is 
the intermingling of liquidity support and fiscal 
transfers, which inevitably arises if some of the 
countries under life support become insolvent 
and thus require debt restructuring. In this 
regard, Germany is adamant that liquidity 
support can never entail fiscal transfers – which 
would breach the no-bail out provision of the 
treaty (e.g. Article 125 TFEU) – and have on this 
account maintained strong pressure on the ECB 
to limit its open market operations in support of 
distressed sovereigns.  
In reality, if adjustment works, there is no reason 
why liquidity support should be turned into fiscal 
transfers. To the extent that confidence is hit by 
fears of insufficient liquidity, the simple act of 
restoring adequate liquidity would stop the run 
and make insolvency, and the need for fiscal 
transfers, unlikely. On the other hand, if there is a 
collapse of liquidity, fiscal transfers may become 
inevitable at least to rescue own (German) banks, 
following the chain-collapse of all other sovereign 
debtors in the union.  
Germany has also insisted that the private sector 
should share the burdens of any debt 
restructuring. As a result of disastrous 
communication, private sector involvement (PSI) 
has become a promise of losses on all outstanding 
eurozone sovereign exposures, without sufficient 
differentiation. Thus investors have started to 
dampen most eurozone sovereigns; even 
Germany has been affected. A cursory look at 
Chart 1 will confirm that contagion really started 
following the Franco-German announcement in 
Deauville that PSI would be part of any financial 
assistance programme, in October 2010. Two 
further jumps in the spreads are clearly 
associated with the July and October, 2011, 
meetings of the Eurosummit, as the 
announcements of rising ‘haircuts’ on Greek debt 
have combined with inadequate liquidity support 
for the other distressed debtors in making private 
investors in eurozone sovereigns run for the door.  
The disgraceful insistence on private sector 
participation has now been abandoned, and our 
wise leaders have reverted to “the well 
established IMF principles and practices” 
whereby each case is assessed on its own merits 
and there is no presumption of losses for private 
investors in connection with financial assistance 
programs. Also the EFSF, later the ESM, will be 
allowed to lever its resources and the unanimity 
rule in decision making will be substituted by 
qualified majority voting (with an 85% majority).  
In general, recent decisions have once again failed 
to convince financial markets that the liquidity 
problem has been tackled. The ESM has not 
gained liquidity access to the ECB, as had been 
envisaged by President van Rompuy in his 
preparatory note for the summit; the total 
available resources have been raised, perhaps, but 
it is not sure. The Eurogroup is still struggling to 
make sense of the cumbersome arrangements that 8 | STEFANO MICOSSI 
 
have been proposed to lever the EFSF resources. 
The persistent refusal to back EFSF obligations 
with the joint and several guaranty of eurozone 
members has left financial markets uncertain as to 
whether individual guaranties will be sufficient, 
as more and more members are hit by contagion. 
And everyone is puzzled by the fact that 
eurozone members are willing to put up euro 200 
billion in credit lines for the IMF to defend the 
euro, hoping that more will come from the 
emerging world, while they are not willing to do 
it directly with the EFSF and the future ESM.  
The only new development was the 
announcement by the ECB of a new unlimited 
term-lending facility for banks, whose undeclared 
but transparent purpose is to encourage banks to 
buy sovereigns again. The snag in the scheme is 
that banks are not likely to buy securities that 
eurozone governments are collectively unable to 
support. Continuing to try to circumvent 
problems, rather than tackling them, will not do.  
Thus, it looks like till the next summit we are in 
for further turmoil, which no doubt will lead to 
more requests by Germany for stronger economic 
governance rules. As Albert Einstein once 
famously remarked: “Folly is doing the same 
thing again and again, and expecting different 
results”. 
In conclusion  
The eurozone has proven so far collectively 
unable to develop a convincing economic strategy 
to revive economic growth, bring excessive public 
debts back to normal levels, restructure the Greek 
debt, and raise credible liquidity walls around the 
other distressed sovereigns. Meanwhile, the costs 
of adjustment in divergent countries are 
ballooning thanks to rising interest rates and 
falling activity, heralding further budgetary cuts 
and further deflation.  
The Eurosummit has to go back to the drawing 
board and agree on a less unbalanced policy 
combination between discipline, liquidity support 
and growth policies. If it cannot be done, the risk 
that the eurozone and the Union will break up, 
with gigantic economic dislocations, will stay 
high. 
As to proposed new fiscal compact by 
intergovernmental treaty, it is already clear that it 
will go nowhere: which is good, since the Union 
institutions might suffer fundamental damage if 
they were to go down that road. The ready 
alternative is to follow the Article 136 procedure, 
which allows eurozone members to insert in the 
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the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Social Welfare Policies 
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Energy and Climate Change 
EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policy 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Politics and Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
 